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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KINGSLEY "\VELLS,
t'
Plaintiff~ Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

THE DENYER & RIO GRANDE
YVESTERN RAILROAD COMP ANY, a corporation,
Defendant

)

10605

q; Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

PRELI1\1INARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for damages for personal injuries
received in a collision at defendant's crossing between
defendant's engine and a car in which plaintiff was a
passenger.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LU\VER COURT
The case was tried before the court sitting with a '
jury. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, the court
directed a verdict against plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the directed verdict and ,
an order granting a new trial.
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
The collision out of which this action arose took
place and occurred at defendant's crossing at Fourth
North Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, at approximately
12 :12 o'clock A.M. on the 15th day of January, 1964. ,
( R. 68, 69) . Plaintiff was a passenger in an auto·
mobile being driven westerly across the crossing by 1
Lorne 0. Lawrence. The train involved in the accident
consisted of a switch engine being operated on defend·
ant's track in a southerly direction, pulling a car and
a caboose. (R. 137).
The crossing consists of eight sets of tracks, the
track in question being No. 8, proceeding across in a
westerly direction. Introduced into evidence at trial '
was a scale diagram prepared by Bush & Gudgell, Inc ..
Engineers, at a scale of one inch equal to 20 feet. (Ex.
IP). The diagram shows that the first seven tracks are
generally parallel, proceeding in a north-south direc· 1
2

i;ion. The D&RG track in question from the north
comes in at an angle from the northwest. See photographs (Ex. 3P-15P and 18D-21D), Exhibits 18D:nD. having been taken the day after the accident, and
3P-I5P in October or November, 1965.) (R. 87, 88,
102, 103). The evidence showed that the crossing in
1 uestion is within the city limits and that the only
1
warning of this crossing is a railroad crossing sign.
(Ex. 5P, lOP, 20D). There was no crossing watchman
and 110 flashing light or gate to warn of the particular
train in question. (R. 71, 79, 141). The scale diagram
shows that the distance from the first set of tracks to
the D&RG track is 135 feet. There are no obstructions
between the entrance of the crossing and the D&RG
track looking north of the crossing. (R. 72, 73).
Lorne 0. Lawrence was employed by the Union
Pacific Railroad Company as a pipefitter and was giving the plaintiff a ride home from the Union Pacific
Shop where the plaintiff was also employed. Plaintiff's
regular ride to and from work was with a fell ow employee who had his day off at the time in question, and
he had arranged with .Mr. Lawrence to give him a ride
home from work on one day a week. (R. 78). .Mr.
Lawrence customarily would drop Mr. 'Vells off on
Ninth North, with ~Ir. Lawrence proceeding west
from that point to his own home. l\fr. Lawrence gave
this ride to Mr. "Tells as a favor. (R. 77-79). Mr. Lawrence described the lighting conditions at the crossing
in question as being very poor, there being a light on
the east and two to the west of the crossing by some
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buildings to the north and south. ( R. 79, 80). There
were numerous lights in the background looking to
the north from the crossing by reason of lights from a
refinery and houses and a small business building. (R.
73, 74, 81). The overpass at Fifth North was not com.
pleted at the time of the accident, and l\lr. Lawrencf
described the crossing in question as being a heavily
traveled crossing, both generally and during the hom:,
around midnight. ( R. 82) .
After work on the night in question l\Ir. Lawrentt
met plaintiff and proceded on his way home, he driving
and .Mr. 'Vells sitting on the right side of the front
seat. He pulled out of the shop and drove a block east
and then south on Third 'Vest to Fourth North Street,
where he made a right turn and proceded west to the
railroad crossing, driving with his headlights on. (R
83). Lawrence drove to the railroad tracks, stopped
the car, looked both ways, and then proceeded acros~
the tracks at approximately 10 miles per hour. As ht
proceeded across the tracks, he continued at a uniform
speed of 10 miles per hour, looking in both directions.
He was looking for possible railroad traffic on any
one of the eight sets of tracks, coming from either direction. He did not see any lights or hear any whistle.
continually moving at a slow speed. The next thing he
knew they were loading him in the ambulance. (R.
84, 85).

Damage was done to the left front pilot footboard
of the engine and to the right front fender, hood, door.
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1

windshield and frame of the automobile. ( R. 69, 70) .
The collision was described as between the left front
eorner of the engine and the right front corner of the
automohile. ( R. 160). The switch engine proceeded
south, past the intersection 204 feet before coming to
a stop. and the car moved southerly along the tracks
80 feet from the point of impact. The point of impact
was located 27 feet north from the curb line of Fourth
Xorth Street at the track in question. (R. 69, 70, 71).
(Exhibit 2P). The windows of the car were up. (R. 89).
Lawrence testified that he had crossed this same
crossing on numerous other occasions and was generally
familiar with it. 'Vhile approaching the crossing, when
he sees equipment approaching on the tracks, he usually
stops before crossing the first track, for the reason that
he never knows what direction other trains may come
from. For this reason, his usual procedure, once ascertaining that the way is clear, is to start across and contllme moving over all of the tracks. ( R. 104, 105) .
Plaintiff called as a witness the engineer of the
train mvolved, Lawrence 'Villiam O'Driscoll. Mr.
O'Driscoll testified that he was on the right side of
the engine and could not see to the left; that he relied
entirely on the fireman and the switchman, who were
sitting on the left. The fireman has visibility to the left
and front of the engine as it is moving forward. (R.
135-137). Mr. O'Driscoll testified that he was familiar
with the D&RG book of rules, and in particular with
Rule 937, which reads:
5

"An engineman
. . must use the . utmost caut1·on
t o prevent stri 1\:mg persons, vehicles, [stock] or

other obstacles."

And further with Rule 949, with respect to the duties
of the fireman :
"vVhile engine is moving, aud when his other
duties permit, fireman must keep a careful lookout, giving engineman instant and understandable notice of any hand, lantern, fusee, or fixed
signals, or conditions that affect the train movement. He must also be alert for signals from
train or engineman of other trains and communicate same, promptly, to engineman."

l\fr. O'Driscoll testified that as the train approached
the crossing in question, it takes a long gradual cum
to the right. (R. 139, 140). He further testified that
he was traveling at approximately 20 miles per hour,
approaching the crossing and relying entirely on the
fireman for lookout to the front and left; that the first
and only warning received from the fireman was that
he hollered "Big Hole," and that just about the time
he hollered "Big Hole," he hit the car in question. He
testified as follows, (R. 141, 142):
"Q So, as far as any westbound traffic was con·
cerned, you were relying entirely upon the fire·
man?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And I will ask you to state whether you
ever received any word-notification from the
fireman as to an automobile being on those tracks
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as you came along, approaching nearer and
nearer to that crossing?
"A No until we got pretty near to the crossing.
"Q. 'Vhat happened ~\tht"
~ you got 'pretty near
to the crossing?'

"A. He hollered 'Big Hole.' I went to emergency.
"Q At the time he hollered Big Hole,' did the
accident happen?

"A Yes, about that time.
"Q Just about the time he hollered 'Big Hole,'
you hit something?

"A Yes, sir.
"Q Up until the time you hit something, you
had never seen anything at all that you hit?

"A That's right.

*

*

*

"Q Did you ever see the object you hit before
you hit it?

"A No, sir.
"Q And, up to the point where the fireman yelled
'Big Hole it,' had you ever slowed down the
engine?

"A No."

On cross examination Mr. O'Driscoll testified that
he blew the whistle for the particular crossing, giving
two longs, a short, and a long, which is the pattern which
he always follows when he approaches a crossing, according to the rules of the railroad. (R. 144).

7

Plaintiff called Raymond A. J aensch as a witness.
J aensch testified that he witnessed the collision. He
stated that he was in the vicinity of a light pole just
short of halfway between Fourth North Street and
Fifth North Street. He was walking on a roadway
northerly, between the Rio Grande mainline track and
the U. P. tracks. He identified the pole as the one
labeled "Power Pole" on the scale diagram. This power
pole, according to the scale of the diagram, is some 280
feet north of the crossing. J aensch testified that he
observed the train approaching the crossing, traveling
at between 20 to 30 miles per hour. ( R. 162) . He
observed the automobile from some 25 feet before reach·
ing the first track and moving across the crossing, and
for some reason just kept watching the automobile
moving at a uniform speed to the point of the accident.
(R. 155, 161).
"A Did the car move uniformly across the crossing?
"A Yes; this is one of the reasons I continued
watching-it never hestitated or anything. It
continued at an even speed."
The train started to blow the whistle at approximately
Fifth North in a sequence of whistles. The whistle
ended somewhere between the point where J aensch was
standing and the crossing, J aensch being unable to
pinpoint exactly where. ( R. 156, 157).
The plaintiff at the time that the car was being
driven across the tracks was sitting on the right-hand
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side of the front seat, resting his eyes, when the accident
happened. He was not aware of the existence of the
train prior to the accident. (R. 109). The next thing
he was 0~,-~f was someone telling him and Lawrence
to stay where they were, that an ambulance was coming.
(R. llO).

The court directed the jury to return a verdict of
No Cause of Action, which was done. (R. 46-A).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFF.
On appeal from a directed verdict, this court has
the duty of reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Graham v. Johnson ( 1946), 109 Utah
346, 166 P.2d 230.

Plaintiff's theory of liability was contained in Requested Instruction No. 7 submitted to the court. (R.
37) . This request stated as follows:
"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence, first, that the fireman on defendant's
engine observed the automobile occupied by
plaintiff as it approached and crossed the tracks
leading to the track occupied by said engine; and
second, that said fireman knew, or in the exercise
of ordinary care should have known, that the
driver of said automobile was unaware of the
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approach of said engine; and third, that the said
fireman failed and neglected to exercise care in
taking reasonable measures to avoid collision with
said automobile, then and in that event, you are
instructed that said defendant was negligent·

* * *"

'

It is plaintiff's theory that the railroad was negli-

gent in failing to keep a proper lookout and on observing the uniform approach of the Lawrence automobile
into the track in question, that the crew should haye
taken action, either by giving additional warning or in
reducing the speed so as to be able to stop if necessary.
Inasmuch as plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, in that he was seated in the car resting
his eyes, the court in reaching its decision had to hold
as a matter of law that there was no evidence from
which the jury could find the defendant negligent, and
that said negligence proximately caused damages to
plaintiff. All reasonable men could not agree to this
from the record in this case.
The duty of the railroad is well stated in the case
of Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., (1932), 79 Utah
439, I I P .2d 305, at page 45I:

"It of course is well established that the right
of the public to the use of a public crossing is
mutual, coextensive, and reciprocal with that
of the railway company, except that the latter,
because of the momentum of trains, the confine·
ment of their movements to the track, and the
necessity and public nature of railway traffic,
has the unquestioned right of way. Such prece·
10

dence, however, does not impose upon the traveler the whole duty of avoiding collisions. Both
parties mnst exercise dne care and diligence with
regard to their duties and are charged with the
mutual duty of exercising reasonable care and
diligence to prevent injury, and that the performance of snch duty may, to a limited extent,
be relied on by each. * * *" (Italics ours) .
The reciprocal duties of the parties are well stated
in the comment following Section 480, American Law
Institute Restatement of the Law of Torts, 2d, at page
336:
Thus, if an engineer of a train approaching a level highway crossing sees a traveler approaching
the track on foot or in a vehicle, he is not immediately required to take any steps either to warn
the traveler by an additional blast of his whistle
or to bring the train under special control, since
he is entitled to assume that the traveler has discovered or will discover the oncoming train and
will stop before reaching the crossing. However,
it is not necessary that the circumstances be such
as to convince the defendant that the plaintiff
is inattentive and, therefore, in danger. It is
enough that the circumstances are such M to
indicate a reasonable chance that this is the case.
Even snch a chance that the plaintiff will not
discover his peril is enough to require the defendant to make a reasonable effort to avoid
injnring him. Therefore, if there is anytlUng
in the demeanor or conduct of the plaintiff which
to a reasonable man in the defendant's positiop;.; ·
would indicate that the plaintiff is inattfnit'7';e
and, therefore,
will or may
not discover
~e ap.
'
\'
proach of the train, the engineer_'{t_U!l>t takes~
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~~' ~~/

steps as a reasonable man would think necessary
under the circumstances. If a train is at son{e
little distance, the blowing of a whistle would
ordinarily be enough, until it is apparent that
the whistle is either unheard or disregarded. The
situation in which the plaintiff is observed mar
clea~ly indicate that his i~attention is likely t~
persist, and that the blowmg of the whistle will
not be effective. If so, the engineer is not entitled to act upon the assumption that the plaintiff will awaken to his danger, but may be liable
if he does not so reduce the speed of his train
as to enable him to stop if necessary." (Italics
ours).
It is submitted that this case falls squarely within
the language above. The evidence shows that the fireman who presumably was keeping a sharp lookout to
the front and left of the train as it approached the
crossing failed to say one word until it was too late to
do anything about the accident. The fireman gave the
warning, "Big Hole," and the accident happened immediately, according to the testimony of the engineer.
'Vith unobstructed vision between the engine and the
crossing the fireman should have seen the same thing
that Raymond J aensch saw. He could have seen the
automobile coming across the seven sets of tracks slowly
at a uniform speed and failing to alter his speed one
iota in spite of the warnings which were being given
in the customary required sequence. Yet, the fireman
failed to say anything. The jury could well find this
to be negligence on the part of the railroad. There was
something about the situation which caused J aensch
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to pay particular attention to it. There was something
about the way the car kept proceeding across the tracks
that caused J aensch to be apprehensive and certainly
should have caused the fireman, who had the duty to
take action.
This situation is somewhat analagous to the last
clear chance situation held in the case of Thompson
v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., (1898), 16 Utah 281,
52 P. 92. The case at bar, however, is stronger than
the Thompson case, inasmuch as plaintiff is not guilty
of contributory negligence. The Thompson case dealt
with a deaf mute, 15-year-old boy, crossing the tracks
of the defendant at an angle, with his back toward the
defendant's approaching car. The operator there observed the boy, rang the bell, and then observing that
the bell did not attract his attention, attempted to stop
the car but failed and struck the boy, carrying him a
distance of about 58 feet before stopping. The evidence was that the rear brake of the car was loose and
kicked off ; that the brakes in the car were not in good
condition and had not been in good condition for some
time. The trial court submitted the case to the jury
under the doctrine of the last clear chance, and this
court affirmed, stating in part:

" * * * If the defendant knowingly placed
in operation upon the public street a defective
car, that could not be controlled because the appliances provided for that purpose were out of
repair, and the injury complained of was occasioned by such defective brakes and appliances,
13

and the motorman was unable to avoid the effect ·
of the contributory negligence of the deceased
because of such defects, then it would probabh'.
be said that the defendant's negligence was th~
proximate cause of the injury."
It is submitted that just as in the Thompson case,
the fireman, as a reasonable man, should have realized
that the automobile in question was proceeding across
the seven sets of tracks despite the warning being given
by the engineer.
It will be recalled that Lawrence stated that the
proper way to cross the tracks was to proceed across
all of the tracks, once ascertaining that they were clear,
for the reason that a person would be in danger from
traffic on other tracks if he proceeded part way acros~
and stopped for a given track. This certainly appears
to be a reasonable way of proceeding across a group
of railway tracks. Reasonable men could so find.

1

In addition to this, reasonable men could find that
the engineer stopped blowing his whistle at some dis·
tance prior to reaching the crossing from the testimony
of Raymond J aensch. J aensch testified that the whistle
stopped blowing somewhere between his position and
the crossing. Reasonable men could certainly find that .
additional warnings would have avoided the accident.
Obviously this is a jury question.

The alternative is that the fireman was keepi,ng
no lookout until the irudant of the accident, which would .
most certainly be negligence.
14

As the Pippy case and numerous other cases have
stated, the railroad has a duty to keep a reasonable
lookout at crossings. It is stated at 44 Am. J ur., par.
510, RAILROADS, at page 750:
"At ordinary crossings it is the duty of the
railroad company to keep a reasonable lookout,
and if the crossing is hazardous because of frequent vehicular traffic or obscured view of the
traYclers, the lookout must be correspondingly
sharp. "\Vhat would answer the requirements of
a reasonable lookout depends, among other
things, upon the amount and kind of travel reasonably to be expected over the crossing, and
the presence or absence of safeguards such as
flagmen, gates, or electric signals."
The crossing involved in this lawsuit is within the
city limits and is a heavily traveled crossing, and a
crossing that does not have flashing light signals, barriers, or a crossing watclunan. In view of these aspects,
the railroad has a duty of keeping a careful lookout;
and when the fireman can observe a vehicle crossing
slowly, approaching the track, a jury can find that he
has a duty of doing something more than sitting inert
until it is too late to avoid the accident. The protection
of human life at such crossings deserves a greater duty
of care than was observed in this case.
Taking Lawrence's testimony that he was traveling IO miles per hour, he would be traveling approximately 15 feet per second, and for a distance of 160
feet from where J aensch first saw him to the track
in question. At this rate it would take him 10.7 seconds.
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This means that for a period of 10.7 seconds the Law.
rence car is in full view of the fireman, who cannot help
but observe that he was continuing into the point of
collision. Reasonable men could find that the fireman
should have done something more in this situatiot.
Taking the testimony of J aensch, the routine series ot'
whistles were started by the engineer approximate]\
one block from the crossing. These whistles were bein;,
blown and heard by the fireman at the very time
that the car was proceeding uniformly into the place
of collision. During these same 10. 7 seconds the engine,
if traveling at 25 miles per hour, was traveling approx1·
mately 396 feet. Who can say that one word of cautio11
from the fireman, with a corresponding reduction of
speed by the engineer or an additional blast of the
whistle by the engineer, would not have avoided the
collision and crippling injuries to the plaintiff.
~

The spirit of the statement contained in the Re·
statement of Torts above demands that when any doubt
exists, the train crew must act. Obviously the firemau
in this case failed to live up to the spirit of this re·
quirement. The least that could be said is that men
of reasonable intelligence could differ as to the conclusion drawn from the facts in this case. This being ,
so, defendant's negligence was a question for the jury
and not for the court.
It is well established that in close or doubtful
cases the law requires the case to be submitted to the
jury. This is indicated by a quotation from the case
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of Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219,
134 P. 567, 570, which was contained in the opinion
in the case of Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., 122 Utah
477, 485, 251 P.2d 867!
"The court can pass upon the question of negligence only in clear cases, * * *

"**

Unless the question of negligence is
free from doubt, the court cannot pass upon it
as a question of law; ·:!f * * if * * * the court is
in doubt whether reasonable men, * * * might
arrive at different conclusions then this very
doubt determines the question to be one of fact
for the jury and not one of law for the court."
-:i:-

This comt stated unequivocally the strong policy of
the law in protecting the right of trial by jury at page
485 in the Stickle case:
"Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of the
vital importance of the privilege of trial by jury
in our system of justice and deem it our duty to
zealously protect and preserve it."
Also see Robison v. Robison, ( 1964), 16 Utah 2d 2,
394 P.2d 876, and DeWeese v. J. C. Penney Co.,
(1956), 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898.
It is submitted that the case at bar is not even
one of those close or doubtful cases requiring the submission of the case to the jury as specified by the above
cases but is a case where the evidence clearly shows
negligence on the part of the defend ant. For instance,
the case at bar is a much stronger case than the case
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of ~lorby v. Rogers, (1953), 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2r]
231, where the court submitted the question of last
clear chance to the jury. The court, following Section
480 of the Restatement of Torts and Graham v. John.
son, supra, held that it was a jury question, relying,
only on the testimony of defendant himself and the
physical facts. The Morby case involved the defendant
hitting plaintiff, a boy, on a bicycle traveling the same
direction. According to defendant's testimony, he wa, 1
traveling 25 miles per hour when he first obse1Ted tht ·
boy on the bicycle, traveling the same direction, abou' ,
300 feet ahead of him. At about 200 feet he sounded
his horn but at no time did the boy ever give any inrli· ,
cation that he heard any warning of defendant's ap·
l
proach. Based on these facts, the court held that it
would not be unreasonable for the jury to find tha 1
the boy was oblivious to his approach. Defendant said
he first realized the danger of collision at 78 feet from
the point of impact, and that he did not sound his horn,
until 20 feet from the boy, at which point he started ,
to turn to his left. The court held that at the point of
78 feet the defendant could have either applied his
brakes or sounded his horn, and that the jury could
find that his failure to do so was negligence under tht'
doctrine of last clear chance.
It is submitted that there is more evidence for the
jury to base a finding of negligence in the case at bar
than in the M orby v. Rogers case. In the case at bar
there is clear evidence from which the jury could find.
that for some 10.7 seconds the car in which plaintiff
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was located continued to cross slowly at a uniform
rate of speed in the face of warnings given by the
defendant in the routine manner. The jury could find
that the fireman should have realized that Lawrence
was oblivious to the approach of the train and should
haYe so notified the engineer so that he could have
slowed dm,rn the train or given additional warning.
It is just as obvious that if the fireman had not been
looking at all for traffic at this unwarned, dangerous
crossing, the jury should find the defendant negligent
on that ground.
The court relied on the case of Gregory v. Denver
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, (1958),
8 Utah 2d 114, 329 P.~d 407, in directing a verdict
in this case. The only similarity between the case at bar
and the Gregory case was that both happened at the
same crossing. However, there are numerous differences
which make the Gregory case not controlling to the
decision in this case. To begin with, the Gregory case
happened in daytime. This case happened on a dark
night. In the Gregory case, the only evidence offered
as to failure to keep a proper lookout was the mere
happening of the accident itself, and the train in the
Gregory case was a much larger train and was traveling at a greater speed. It is obvious that the engine and
two cars involved in this case could be controlled more
easily than the large train at the greater speed involved
in the Gregory case. In this case we have evidence
that the car involved could be seen crossing slowly and
uniformly a distance of 160 feet over a time period of
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